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 Introduction 
 It is increasingly recognized in the management literature that the initial public off ering 
(IPO) is an important stage in the life cycle of privately held and entrepreneurial fi rms. 
At this critical juncture, a fi rm has overcome the fi rst challenges of its entrepreneurial 
phase and entered a growth stage. As  Fama and French ( 2004 : 229) emphasize, an IPO 
“is the point of entry that gives fi rms expanded access to equity capital, allowing them to 
emerge and grow.” An IPO can provide an entrepreneurial fi rm with critical resources 
for its future expansion. It can also provide the entrepreneur with the fi rst substantive 
access to cash from their investment of time and resources in the entrepreneurial eff ort. 
 Despite the growing awareness of the importance of IPOs among both academics and 
the investor community, the process by which a privately held fi rm transforms itself into 
a publicly traded company is still not well understood. While numerous studies have 
investigated the determinants of the going public decision (e.g.  Booth and Smith,  1986 ; 
 Jain and Kini,  1999 ) and post-issue performance (e.g.  Beatty and Ritter,  1986 ;  Brav, 
Geczy, and Gompers,  2000 ;  Espenlaub and Tonks,  1998 ;  Michaely and Shaw,  1994 ), there 
is relatively little research on the related but equally important issue of what factors 
infl uence the corporate governance mechanism of a fi rm at IPO stage, and how the spe-
cifi c characteristics of this mechanism such as board composition, executive incentives, 
and ownership interests of private equity investors may aff ect the IPO’s performance. 
 Organizational theorists have increasingly drawn on agency theory (e.g.  Beatty and 
Zajac,  1994 ;  Brennan and Franks,  1997 ;  Mikkelson et al.,  1997 ) and upper echelon 
research (e.g.  Certo et al.,  2001b ;  Hambrick and Mason,  1984 ;  Higgins and Gulati,  1999 ) 
to generate a body of conceptual and empirical research that is focused on corporate 
governance problems of IPOs. A major underlying assumption of this research is that of 
an information asymmetry between the IPO’s team, underwriters, and public market 
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investors that may create agency costs and lead to a substantial reduction in IPO per-
formance (see  Certo et al.,  2001a ; and  Michaely and Shaw,  1994 , for an extensive discus-
sion). For example, underpricing of the stock at the IPO, the diff erence between the 
initial price at which a fi rm’s stock is off ered and the closing price of the stock on the fi rst 
day of trading, is a major concern to the entrepreneurial fi rm and to the entrepreneur 
since it represents value the market ultimately sees in the stock but which the fi rm/entre-
preneur did not obtain when the stock was fi rst off ered for sale ( Daily et al.,  2003 ; 
 Ibbotson et al.,  1988 ). 1 
 Th is chapter is focused on complex interrelationships between corporate governance 
and performance of the IPO fi rm. Its fi rst contribution is the exploration of agency con-
fl icts, not as a unitary concept as has been done in prior research, but instead as two dis-
tinctive types of agency problems (adverse selection and moral hazard). It analyzes the 
eff ectiveness of fi rm-level signals associated with private equity ownership patterns with 
regard to each of these types of agency problems within entrepreneurial IPO fi rms. It 
brings in the debate about the development of executive pay schemes at this transitional 
time (particularly linked with the dilution of ownership and increase of agency prob-
lems). A third contribution is related to the discussion of the governance roles of venture 
capital syndicates since, as a rule, IPO fi rms have a number of private equity backers 
when they come to the stock market. Finally, it proposes further areas for research to 
improve knowledge of this particular change in strategy, organizational structure, and 
the dynamic development of the fi rm. 
 Information Asymmetries and the Roles 
of Corporate Governance in IPO Firms 
 Information asymmetries, or diff erences in information between the various parties to 
the listing process, including the IPO fi rm, banks-underwriters, entrepreneur, and 
external investors, has been the foundation of prior investigations of underpricing 
( Ritter and Welch,  2002 ).  Bruton et al. ( 2009 ) show that information asymmetry leads 
to two distinctive types of agency problems—adverse selection and moral hazard. To 
illustrate adverse selection agency confl ict a manager may not accurately reveal all he/
she knows about a fi rm. As  Ritter and Welch ( 2002 : 1807) argue: “aft er all, small inves-
tors cannot take a tour of the fi rm and its secret inventions.” Specifi cally, at IPO this may 
take the form of overly optimistic estimates of the fi rm’s revenues by one of these parties. 
Th ese overly optimistic estimates can increase the expected value of the fi rm and in turn 
increases the rewards from the IPO and are a type of adverse selection agency confl ict. 
Moral hazard problems emerge when information asymmetries make it possible for 
managers to pursue self-serving objectives and not act at maximum effi  ciency and eff ec-
tiveness for the fi rm. For example, founder-managers may hold signifi cant equity stakes 
in the IPO fi rm, and there is the potential for these individuals to abuse public market 
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investors ( Bruton et al.,  2010 ). An entrenched founder-CEO may also try to retain a 
leadership position even when his/her skills become inadequate to new challenges faced 
by the fi rm ( Nelson,  2003 ). As a result of these information asymmetries, there are 
potential agency costs when a fi rm experiences an IPO since managers may not reveal 
actions within the fi rm or do not take certain actions that maximize the fi rm benefi t 
( Sanders and Boivie,  2004 ). 
 At IPO investors recognize the potential impact of the agency costs associated with 
information asymmetries, and they will therefore anticipate potential agency costs and 
price-protect themselves, thus leading to an IPO discount. Prior research approximates 
this discount by a lower industry-adjusted off er price/book or price/sales ratios (e.g. 
 Chahine and Filatotchev,  2008 ), while others associate it with greater underpricing, 
measured by the diff erence between the fi rst-day-trading closing price and the off er 
price (e.g.  Daily et al.,  2003 ), suggesting that the aft ermarket price provides a good proxy 
for an intrinsic value of the IPO fi rm. Some researchers, however, argue that the uncer-
tainties and information asymmetries cannot be resolved on the fi rst day of trading, and 
suggest using longer-term proxies for the stock market discount ( Aggarwal and Rivoli, 
 1990 ;  Loughran et al.,  1994 ). 
 However, the IPO team may use corporate governance-related signals that allow 
potential investors to better understand the true value of the fi rm and reduce risks of 
agency problems, which in turn can improve the IPO fi rm’s performance ( Sanders and 
Boivie,  2004 ). Corporate governance studies in the IPO context have recognized a wide 
range of potential “good governance signals” that include board characteristics, execu-
tive incentives, and the governance roles of early stage investors. Th ese governance fac-
tors play a dual role in addressing two types of agency confl icts in an IPO fi rm. First, 
they may convey important signals about the “quality” of IPO fi rm, and this may reduce 
the extent of adverse selection problems. For example, by attracting prestigious and 
experienced independent board members, an IPO fi rm can diff erentiate itself from 
other “poor quality” IPOs. At the same time, these independent directors may improve 
the extent and quality of monitoring, which imposes constraints on managerial discre-
tion and reduces moral hazard-type agency confl icts. Likewise, venture capitalist may 
play important certifi cation and monitoring roles that aff ect both types of agency con-
fl icts. By carefully selecting their investment targets, they certify the quality of fi rms they 
bring to the stock market. In addition, venture capitalists (VCs) oft en retain their own-
ership aft er the fl otation, and their objectives and post-issue monitoring incentives may 
be aligned with public market investors ( Bruton et al.,  2010 ). 
 A central premise of this research is that corporate governance factors may be impor-
tant signals to investors with regard to the quality of a particular IPO fi rm, as well as the 
extent to which their interests are protected from insiders’ opportunism during and aft er 
the fl otation. As a result, corporate governance characteristics should have a signifi cant 
impact on a wide range of IPO performance metrics, such as underpricing, longer-term 
performance, and survival. In the following sections, we look at diff erent governance 
factors, such as board characteristics, early stage investors, and executive compensation 
in IPO fi rms, and how they may aff ect performance.  Table  19.1 provides the main fi nd-
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ings from the studies reviewed. Bearing in mind the large number of publications on 
this topic in economics, fi nance, and management, it is impossible to include all studies 
that have been published over last 30 years. Instead, we include some widely cited publi-
cations in this fi eld, covering a range of country sample, periods of studies, and per-
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formance indicators of IPO fi rms. As this table clearly shows, previous research on the 
governance in IPO fi rms has identifi ed a wide range of governance mechanisms that 
may have both value-enhancing and value-destroying eff ects. Th is may explain the 
ambiguity of empirical fi ndings that so far have failed to provide a consistent picture of 
the governance impacts in IPO fi rms. 
 Board Characteristics and 
Performance of IPO Firms 
 Boards of directors are a common feature of companies throughout the world, so it is easy 
to see that, for companies, the board of directors represents a prime strategic driver. 
Indeed, its duties range from the appointment of directors, self evaluation measures, col-
lective responsibility, and reporting to external audiences. However, the board of direc-
tors has a particular role at the time of an initial public off ering, starting with the decision 
to take the company public. In this process the board will have the challenge of selecting 
underwriters, approving off er terms, providing vital information for the prospectus doc-
ument, and essentially overseeing the IPO process (and at the point of the IPO consider-
able information asymmetry will exist). More recently, the fi duciary duties of directors 
mean that the directors are subject to personal liability for statements made at this time. 
 Board Composition and Performance 
 Investors’ perception of the board of directors is oft en gained via the prospectus docu-
ment, and strong boards provide the investor with future governance signals ( Certo, 
 2003 ). Investors may view the board from the perspective of managerial talent, board 
independence, and entrepreneurial founders. 
 Human capital theory shows us that directors’ expertise, experience, and specifi c 
knowledge can all add value to a company’s successful performance ( Hillman and 
Dalziel,  2003 ) and contribute to overall corporate governance ( Arthurs et al.,  2008 ; 
 Carpenter and Westphal,  2001 ). Indeed  D’Aveni ( 1990 ) argues that prestigious directors 
in terms of their human capital can be indicative of the overall quality of the fi rm (useful 
under the signaling hypothesis). Similarly, it is not just directors’ experience that is 
examined here; studies have examined the age of directors ( Cohen and Dean,  2005 ) and 
their educational levels ( Lester et al.,  2006 ). Arguably, age has a direct link to expertise, 
knowledge, and experience, which in term translates into the ability to perform a job 
well ( Tesluk and Jacobs,  1998 ). 
 Th ere is also the notion of board characteristics as examined by the view of board 
independence. Board independence is oft en seen as the proportion of executives/non-
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executives, but can also be seen in terms of insiders and outsiders on the board (how-
ever, not all non-executives can be deemed independent). At the time of the IPO, the 
board may be in a development phase, and so strategic selection of non-executive direc-
tors to balance the existing executive directors’ experience gaps is vital ( Shivdasani and 
Yermack,  1999 ;  Westphal,  1998 ). As such, the requirements of balancing skills will oft en 
cause the IPO company to prefer directors who are involved with other boards ( Beatty 
and Zajac,  1994 ). From a resource-based view of the fi rm ( Pfeff er,  1972 ), broadening the 
board’s experience at this particular point in the development life cycle is vital to future 
success. Similarly, the appointment of well-connected non-executives will provide bar-
gaining power in discussions with underwriters and investors ( Provan,  1980 ). Th ey are 
also able to bring in further business contacts as the fi rm grows. A positive aspect of this 
practice is that, by gaining established non-executive directors on the board, certifi ca-
tion of good governance practice is established, and thus at IPO this can (under signal-
ing hypotheses) add additional value and diff erentiate a particular issue for future 
investors. However, the downside is that outside directors have the potential for high 
levels of “interlocks” ( Dalton et al.,  1999 ;  Zahra and Pearce,  1989 ), something the UK 
Corporate Governance Code ( Financial Reporting Council,  2010 ) attempts to limit. 
Th us, in terms of good practice, listing authorities arguably prefer more independent 
boards and, in general, so do investors ( Gompers,  1995 ). 
 Founders and Boards 
 Just as broader aspects of board characteristics can be considered, there is also the case 
of the entrepreneurial IPO that has the founders of the company on the board. Most 
founders who make decisions to fl oat their companies are oft en considered by outside 
investors as “untested” from a board point of view when they take their fi rms public 
( Wat,  1983 ). However, in today’s dynamic economy, we see the presence of founders 
within many company contexts (e.g. Steve Jobs at Apple, Bill Gates at Microsoft ), and 
they are particularly relevant for younger, high-growth fi rms and technology fi rms 
( Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven,  1990 ). In the context of the initial public off ering com-
pany, around one-third to one-half of fl otations go public with founders at the helm, and 
receive handsome off er prices compared with non-founder valuations ( Certo et al., 
 2001b ;  Nelson,  2003 ). Th us, considering the role of the founder at the point of the fl ota-
tion has value, particularly as founders have considerable power due to large ownership 
stakes ( Jain and Tabak,  2008 ) and extensive skills. 
 As a founder member of the fi rm, their infl uence is seen in defi ning the fi rm’s pur-
pose, i.e. the mission statement which then translates through the company to organiza-
tional attributes such as structure ( Kunze,  1990 ;  Vesper,  1996 ). Some authors ( Baron 
et al.,  1999 ) argue that this is the founder “imprinting” his/her will on the fi rm, and this 
will then continue unless the founder exits the company ( Mintzberg and Waters,  1982 ). 
Indeed  Monks and Minow ( 2004 ) argue that this is a result of the extensive ownership 
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that some founders have, enabling them to be revered in their company context, and 
greater ownership levels do indeed lead to founders commanding the CEO position 
( Nelson,  2003 ). Combined with the founder’s position, this aff ords them extensive 
power, and it is not unusual to see founders in the dual role of CEO and chair ( Beatty 
and Zajac,  1994 ;  Daily and Dalton,  1997 ;  Finkelstein and D’Aveni,  1994 ). Th ere is also a 
further strengthening of founder power when a family is involved (particularly where 
parents and children are concerned) ( Schulze et al.,  2003 ). 
 Th e infl uence that the founder has through the structural aspects of the board does 
not, however, necessarily translate into performance. Several studies have begun to 
question whether fi rms managed by their founder perform diff erently from those man-
aged by non-founders ( Begley,  1995 ;  Jayraman et al.,  2000 ). However, the attribution of 
performance to founders has mixed support and is oft en entangled with other variables, 
namely ownership levels and board independence ( Adams et al.,  2009 ;  Nelson,  2003 ; 
 Villalonga and Amit,  2006 ). 
 Th e role of the founder is not infi nite, though, and perhaps at the IPO, more than at 
any other time, it comes into question. Some question whether the founder is the best 
person managerially to lead a fi rm into the public-listing phase of its life cycle. Founders 
may not have the inclination to develop new skills to suit the challenges that come with a 
fl otation ( Jain and Tabak,  2008 ). Oft en changes in leadership are required ( Greiner, 
 1972 ). Th e issue of a more independent board arises and, with it, the replacement of the 
founder with a professional successor just prior to the fl otation process ( Jain and Tabak, 
 2008 ;  Wasserman,  2003 ). 
 Executive Remuneration in IPOs 
 For any private company undergoing an initial public off ering, the process provides an 
opportunity to look at the key issues of executive pay and make some strategic decisions 
with regard to how executives are remunerated. Whilst other chapters look at executive 
remuneration in more detail, for the IPO, company executive pay is particularly tied to 
the life cycle of the fi rm and the professionalization aspects of the board of directors. 
First, the company must acknowledge the role that remuneration can play as a govern-
ance tool. Typically this comes from an agency perspective, relying on the objective of 
bridging the gap between owners and self-serving managers ( Berle and Means,  1932 ; 
 Fama,  1980 ;  Jensen and Meckling,  1976 ). Second, managers must prepare themselves for 
the future reporting of their pay structures. From the fl otation onwards, pay strategies 
and remuneration amounts will have to be transparent. Regardless of the wishes of the 
board of directors, following the IPO there will be the potential for public (and investor) 
scrutiny of executive pay via the annual report and accounts. Th e challenge for the IPO 
company thus is that the development of their scheme at the IPO needs to set the com-
pensation philosophy for the immediate future of the company. It needs to address key 
issues about what the compensation mix should be (and how much should be provided), 
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what incentives need to be addressed, what might be the role of share options schemes, 
and in particular how these might be structured with regard to performance measures, 
comparators, and targets. 
 Th e transfer of ownership into the public domain gives a unique opportunity for the 
company to consider its philosophy with regard to remuneration. It can be considered 
that this will serve the company throughout this life-cycle change and could provide 
grounding to strategically position pay for the board of directors. Furthermore, as the 
company seeks to grow, it will look to hire new people to the board, and thus compensa-
tion packages become an important asset in attracting and retaining talent. 
 Compensation Mix 
 Th e compensation mix is related to discussions about and answers to questions such as: 
where do you want to position pay for your executives relative to your peers or industry? 
Th e professionalization of the board ( Daily and Dalton,  1992 ;  Flamholtz,  1986 ) and the 
need for the recruitment and retention of executive talent ( Conyon,  2000 ;  Daily and 
Dalton,  1992 ) makes these initial decisions particularly relevant. First, the mix generally 
comprises base salary, annual bonus, and long-term performance pay. To consider these 
aspects fully it is not unusual for the IPO company to begin the process at least six 
months before the IPO, and many of the details about rewards will be placed in the fi rm’s 
IPO prospectus. 
 Base Salary and Annual Bonus 
 Little seems to be said about base salaries. However, the typical CEO in the US makes 
between $500,000 and $1 million per year in base salary ( Wall Street Journal ,  2010 ), with 
the fi gure for the UK being £131,000 (for companies with a turnover of up to £50m) 
( Institute of Directors,  2011 ). However, for an IPO company, base salary varies and per-
haps can be better described in terms of market capital valuations at the point of the 
IPO. As with mature companies, there is a link to size of company, with average top 
directors gaining base salaries of £140,000 (for market capital of £30–50m) to £208,000 
(for market capital of £101–250m) ( Deloitte & Touche,  2005a ). However, of greater 
impact (and perhaps a more cost-eff ective method) are the longer-term incentives pro-
vided at this point. 
 Long-Term Incentives 
 Since long-term incentives make up a large proportion of executive pay for both US and 
UK executives ( Deloitte & Touche,  2005a ,  2005b ), it is vital that the IPO company 
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remains in line with mature companies in terms of its pay structure. As with mature 
companies, the purpose of the long-term incentive is threefold: to align the interests of 
the executive managers with those of shareholders ( Nohel and Todd,  2005 ;  Rosen,  1990 ; 
 Tosi et al.,  1997 ), to strengthen the links between compensation and the long-term per-
formance of the company ( Buck et al.,  2003 ;  Conyon and Sadler,  2001 ;  Hall,  1998 ;  Jensen 
and Murphy,  1990 ;  Kroll et al.,  2007 ), and to reward/motivate the executive for/toward 
performance achievements ( Liu and Stark,  2009 ;  Mackey,  2008 ;  Tosi et al.,  2000 ). 
 Aft er the report by  Greenbury ( 1995 ), the variety of long-term incentives has 
increased. However, in general we can categorize them as taking one of two main forms. 
Th e executive share option (ESO) gives the recipient the right to purchase a number of 
shares at a specifi ed price (usually the price when the option is granted: a point we will 
discuss later) for a specifi ed period of time subject to performance criteria being met, 
whilst the long-term incentive plan (LTIP) awards a grant of shares (at zero cost) that 
vest (i.e. transfer ownership to the executive) upon the attainment of predetermined 
performance criteria. Both types of scheme have particular tax implications, but these 
are beyond the scope of this chapter, and both schemes provide a way of linking execu-
tive pay to performance ( Fama and Jensen,  1983a ,  1983b ). Th e decisions with regard to 
performance benchmarks (which must be met in order for the shares to be bought or 
vested in the executive) can also be used to complement the company’s strategy. For per-
formance criteria, there are two general schools of thought, using either a market-based 
measure of performance such as shareholder return or shareholder wealth, or a more 
traditional accounting measure, i.e. earnings per share. When developing the particu-
lars of the new scheme, the IPO company would be wise to look toward the particular 
practices of similar companies to provide adequate comparators to ensure ongoing com-
petitive salaries. 
 Share Options Granted at the Point 
of the IPO Flotation 
 When it comes to paying executives, many IPO companies prefer equity rewards over 
cash compensation. Th ey provide a good signal for agent alignment ( Jensen and 
Meckling,  1976 ), with a potential upside of giving ownership in a company the execu-
tives are likely to lead. IPO options are also seen to encourage a higher propensity of risk 
taking ( Beatty and Zajac,  1994 ;  Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia,  1998 ), which in turn can 
lead to better performance ( Hall and Leibman,  1998 ). However, more recently, there 
have also been discussions about the way particular reference is made to share options at 
the point of the IPO, given that the executives (in particular the CEO) are able to infl u-
ence the timing of the IPO and thus the option grant ( Lie,  2005 ;  Yermack,  1997 ). Th is is 
more signifi cant when the CEO is also the founder of the company ( Certo et al.,  2003 ). 
Th is is particularly relevant as the IPO share option will have an exercise price equal to 
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 10/22/2012, SPi
0001742051.INDD   432 10/22/2012   12:38:44 PM
corporate governance in ipos    433
the off er price for the IPO and high levels of underpricing for IPO issues have been seen 
for company fl oatations ( Daily et al.,  2003 ;  Filatotchev and Bishop,  2002 ). With the 
option exercise price equal to the off er price,  Lowry and Murphy ( 2007 ) argue that off er 
prices may be deliberately defl ated so that executives maximize option gains due to 
underpricing (but their study shows no tangible link between options and underpric-
ing). However, the picture is perhaps not just one of simple timing combined with CEO 
power and infl uence. 
 Other factors are deemed to come into play with regard to off er prices and underpric-
ing of the IPO, for example, highly independent boards can counterbalance CEO power 
( Core et al.,  1999 ) which would reduce underpricing ( Filatotchev and Bishop,  2002 ). 
Furthermore, future investors might prefer companies with more independent boards 
( Gompers,  1995 ). Th ere is also the impact that venture capitalist involvement might have 
on the choice of share options ( Allcock and Filatotchev,  2010 ) and off er pricing levels 
( Fried et al.,  1998 ). If venture capitalists are driving the timing of the IPO, then they may 
off er options at a low off er price in order to compensate the CEO for his support for the 
IPO timing. 
 For the executive, any underpricing at the point of the IPO represents money left  on 
the table. Founder-CEOs who are granted stock options at the IPO may be seen as 
opportunistic managers ( Zhang,  2006 ), using the options to generate gains that off set 
the wealth loss from underpricing due to their pre-IPO ownership. However, with large 
option awards, this might be counteracted because a low option price would provide the 
executive with high levels of future gains due to the increase of the share price immedi-
ately aft er the fl otation. If shares continue to increase in value, the IPO option will ulti-
mately increase the value and then signifi cantly add to the level of the executives’ 
compensation. Th e fi nal caveat here would be that boards at IPO are undergoing a major 
transition and much of the rationale for grants relies on executives remaining within the 
company (usually for three years, i.e. a normal vesting period). Th us there may arguably 
be an alternative perspective for the IPO option, and rather than alignment, their poten-
tial for high gain can be a way of tying the executive to the board for a period of time. 
Th is may be viewed from a resource-based view of the fi rm perspective and might 
 signifi cantly attract investors as board stability could increase overall company 
performance. 
 Th e above demonstrates that planning remuneration for the IPO company, particu-
larly as this takes part during the pre-IPO stage, can be diffi  cult. Th ere must be reference 
to developing schemes that balance cost effi  ciency, competition for talent in the sector, 
whilst ensuring that the scheme signals good governance for shareholder alignment. 
Perhaps with this in light, the following key points for the IPO company should be 
remembered. When initiating executive share option schemes, the board should plan 
and view schemes as complementary to core company strategy. Th is way they will link 
in with the life-cycle development of the fi rm. However, it is important to remember 
that the IPO process is a time of dynamic change. Th e board should thus keep challeng-
ing and refi ning compensation in line with the changes that are happening, remember-
ing that plans will need to change as the market, company strategy, and maturity stages 
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change. Th is also might be a time of change for the board of directors. With this in mind, 
existing board members will need to pay particular attention to compensation and 
reward when in negotiation to recruit and/or retain staff . In order to do this eff ectively 
and transparently, it is best if share option plans are kept simple. 
 The Governance Roles of Private 
Equity Firms 
 As entrepreneurial fi rms gradually “professionalize,” they increasingly look outside for 
fi nancial resources provided by various early stage investors. Venture capitalists serve 
an important role in the development of promising young ventures ( Barry et al.,  1990 ). 
VCs raise funds from passive investors and then invest those funds through staged 
fi nancing in various portfolio fi rms ( Gompers and Lerner,  1999 ). Although VCs oft en 
do not have detailed scientifi c knowledge about the specifi c technology in their portfo-
lio fi rms, they are able to economize on their selection and monitoring costs by focus-
ing their investments in certain industries. By specializing in these industries, they are 
able to develop a comparative advantage over other investors. Additionally, their 
involvement in corporate governance helps them to rapidly bring these ventures to a 
successful exit through an IPO and aids them in generating added value beyond the 
capital provided. 
 Venture Capitalists and “Certification 
Hypothesis” 
 Agency research and the related “certifi cation” framework (e.g.  Barry et al.,  1990 ;  Black 
and Gilson,  1998 ;  Lerner,  1995 ) suggest that an entrepreneurial venture can signal its 
expected value by who has invested in the fi rm. Principal among early-stage investors 
are private equity investors who are the second most important group of shareholders, 
aft er founders, in an entrepreneurial venture ( Lerner,  1998 ). Th is is because successful 
investors’ time and ability to invest in numerous new ventures is limited so they will 
invest in those ventures they feel will be the most successful. Th us, private equity inves-
tors would be expected from an agency perspective to be involved with those ventures 
they feel are going to be successful. As a result, their presence can certify to public inves-
tors the value of the IPO fi rm. 
 Private equity investors, however, are not homogeneous and represent a diverse 
range of diff erent types of investors, including VC fi rms, buyout fi rms, leveraged buy-
out (LBO) specialists, and “business angels.” Th ere are substantial diff erences in 
investment strategies and time horizons among these investors. For example, VCs, as 
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a rule, specialize in investing in early-stage ventures such as entrepreneurial start-ups, 
whereas buyout fi rms and LBO experts focus on management buyouts and LBOs. VC 
fi rms are formed as partnerships, whereas “business angels” represent wealthy indi-
viduals investing on their own behalf. Th e vast majority of IPO-related papers focus 
on the “certifi cation” role of VCs only, and we will return to this issue later. Th is 
research places an emphasis on the roles of VC investors in the price discovery process 
at the time of an IPO, arguing that they may reduce information asymmetry at the 
time of the issue, and their presence can have a value-enhancing eff ect ( Lerner,  1995 ). 
Th us, the presence of VC investors can mitigate the adverse selection problem in an 
entrepreneurial venture. 
 Depending on their retained ownership, early-stage investors may also have an incen-
tive to be involved in the decision-making process and to exert a signifi cant infl uence on 
management before and aft er fl otation. Since seed and development funding normally 
causes dilution of initial founders’ holdings, it can create a misalignment of incentives in 
issuing fi rms. VC fi rms design their contracts to reduce this information asymmetry 
and maximize the disclosure of private knowledge by the entrepreneur-founder ( Shane 
and Cable,  2002 ). Th e IPO is characterized by lock-up arrangements which make 
retained ownership by VCs relatively illiquid aft er the IPO. As a result, their retained 
concentrated ownership imposes a cost on them. Th us, their retained ownership signals 
their belief in the value of the fi rm to minority investors ( Brav and Gompers,  2003 ). 
Second, concentrated private ownership leads to a reduction of coordination costs 
related to multiple types of private and public equity investors in the IPO fi rm and cre-
ates a Jensen-Meckling-type incentive alignment eff ect that jointly may mitigate the 
post-IPO risk of moral hazard ( Jensen and Meckling,  1976 ). Th erefore, VC investors’ 
ownership concentration may be a particularly important governance parameter that 
enhances IPO fi rm performance and reduces the negative eff ects of the “IPO discount” 
arising from agency confl icts. Early prior US research suggests that VCs play a certifi ca-
tion role at the time of IPOs. VCs act as third-party certifying agents, reducing initial 
underpricing ( Jelic et al.,  2005 ).  Megginson and Weiss ( 1991 ) fi nd lower initial returns 
for venture-backed IPOs. 2 Using a unique sample of private fi rms for which there is 
fi nancial data available in the years before and aft er their IPO,  Katz ( 2009 ) diff erentiates 
between those that have private equity sponsorship (PE-backed fi rms) and those that do 
not (non-PE-backed fi rms). Th e fi ndings indicate that PE-backed fi rms generally have 
higher earnings quality than those that do not have PE sponsorship, engage less in earn-
ings management, and report more conservatively both before and aft er the IPO. While 
more reputable VCs initially select better quality fi rms, more reputable VCs continue to 
be associated with superior long-run performance, even aft er controlling for VC selec-
tivity. Th e authors fi nd more reputable VCs exhibit more active post-IPO involvement 
in the corporate governance of their portfolio fi rms and this continued VC involvement 
positively infl uences post-IPO fi rm performance. In the UK,  Levis ( 2008 ) examines the 
aft ermarket performance of private equity-backed initial public off erings (IPOs), based 
on a hand-collected sample of private equity-backed and equivalent samples of venture 
capital-backed and other non-sponsored issues on the London Stock Exchange. Th e evi-
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dence suggests that private equity-backed IPOs exhibit superior performance compared 
with their counterparts throughout the 36-month period in the aft ermarket; such per-
formance is robust across diff erent benchmarks and estimation procedures. However, 
 Coakley and Hadass ( 2007 ) analyze the post-issue operating performance of 316 ven-
ture-backed and 274 non-venture UK IPOs for the period 1985–2003. Cross-section 
regression results indicate support for venture capital certifi cation in the non-bubble 
years, but a signifi cantly negative relationship between operating performance and ven-
ture capitalist board representation during the bubble years. Finally,  Hochberg et al. 
( 2007 ) fi nd that better-networked VC fi rms experience signifi cantly better fund per-
formance, as measured by the proportion of investments that are successfully exited 
through an IPO or a sale to another company. 
 However, recent IPO literature suggests that potential confl icts of interest among pre-
IPO investors may lead to higher underpricing. On the one hand,  Gompers ( 1996 ) 
argues that less experienced VCs may grandstand, i.e. take fi rms public earlier than more 
established fi rms, in order to raise their profi le in the market and attract capital in future 
rounds. On the other hand,  Loughran and Ritter ( 2004 ) propose a “corruption hypoth-
esis,” where they argue that some pre-IPO investors (e.g. VCs) may look to extract rents 
through deliberate underpricing, in exchange for preferential share allocation in further 
underpriced IPOs. Within this framework,  Francis and Hasan ( 2001 ) and  Lee and Wahal 
( 2004 ) show that, in recent years, US venture capital-backed IPOs experience larger 
fi rst-day returns than comparable non-venture-backed IPOs. Th is suggests the exist-
ence of a potential confl ict of interests between VC fi rms and the IPO fi rm. In addition, 
following  Arthurs et al.’s ( 2008 ) confl icting voices argument, VCs have a dual identity as 
both principals and agents. Th ese investors are oft en part of limited partnerships that 
place pressure on them to obtain fast results and to seek a timely realization of their 
investment. Hence VCs are relatively short-term investors who are likely to be seeking at 
IPO to realize their gains from their value-adding activities for the venture ( Arthurs 
et al.,  2008 ), as well as to establish their reputation in order to raise further funds. Th ese 
results are in line with fi ndings in  Chahine and Filatotchev ( 2008 ), who show that bank-
affi  liated VCs lead to a poorer IPO performance in France. 
 Th erefore, previous research on the governance role of private equity investors in IPO 
fi rms has identifi ed both value-enhancing and value-destroying eff ects associated with 
this type of owner. On one hand, private equity investors carefully select their portfolio 
companies and provide them with the fi nancial and managerial support necessary to 
develop and grow a new venture. Th is leads to a strong “certifi cation” eff ect that may 
reduce information asymmetries and associated adverse selection agency costs. On the 
other hand, a limited time horizon associated with lock-up arrangements and exit ori-
entation may substantially undermine the monitoring capacity and incentives of private 
equity investors, leading to an increase in moral hazard costs. 
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 Syndicated Private Equity Investments 
in IPO Firms 
 In a syndication, two or more venture capital fi rms come together to take an equity stake 
in an investment. Th e percentage of investments syndicated in the UK venture capital 
market rose in 1999 to 27 percent aft er having fallen for several years. Th is was followed 
by a sharp fall in 2000 and 2001 to about half this level as venture capital fi rms moved 
away from the high-tech sector following the collapse of the dot.com boom. By 2002, 
the more uncertain investment environment appears to have been associated with a fur-
ther sharp increase, with 26.5 percent of investments being syndicated ( Filatotchev 
et al.,  2006 ). Private equity fi rms typically undertake repeat syndication over time with a 
network of partners ( Bygrave,  1987 ,  1988 ). 
 Each syndicate usually contains lead and non-lead fi rms, with an individual venture 
capital fi rm playing both roles over time depending on the particular deal. Each syndi-
cate is temporary in nature, with the fi nancing structure constructed specifi cally for that 
transaction. Th is limited longevity of the syndicated investments may create moral haz-
ard problems associated with the “principal–principal” relationship between syndicate 
members ( Filatotchev et al.,  2006 ). 
 Syndicated investments may be riskier than stand-alone ventures. A fully diversifi ed 
portfolio is more diffi  cult for private equity fi rms than for institutional investors who 
invest in listed stock because of the presence of large ex ante asymmetric information in 
investment decisions ( Lockett and Wright,  2001 ;  Reid,  1998 ;  Sahlman,  1990 ). Syndication 
thus may be undertaken as a means of risk sharing through portfolio diversifi cation as it 
permits private equity fi rms to invest in more portfolio companies than would other-
wise be possible ( Cumming,  2006 ). 
 Venture capital syndicates involve the sharing of decision-making among the syndi-
cate members. Th e lower the level of cooperation among syndicate members, the greater 
the levels of relational risk and hence the associated agency costs. Th e origins of the 
agency costs in the syndicate may arise from the diverse objectives of members and the 
time-consuming nature of coordination. In VC deals with multiple rounds of fi nancing, 
the lead investor may also have an informational advantage vis-à-vis other syndicate 
members who enter in later rounds ( Admati and Pfl eiderer,  1994 ). 
 Th is complex relationship between multiple principals is defi ned as a “principal–
principal” agency problem ( Filatotchev et al.,  2006 ), as opposed to the principal–agent 
problem between investor and investee. Th ese agency problems can in principle be 
addressed in a number of ways. Shared equity ownership in private equity fi rms syndi-
cates may bring benefi ts in terms of higher levels of trust and knowledge acquisition 
( Beamish and Banks,  1987 ), as well as mutual forbearance and stability ( Mjoen and 
Tallman,  1997 ;  Yan and Gray,  2001 ), which provides an eff ective remedy to situations 
where the lead syndicate member has access to more information about the investee 
than the non-lead members. 
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 However, lead venture capital fi rms may seek a larger equity stake in return for their 
greater eff ort in monitoring the investee and coordinating the syndicate ( Wright and 
Lockett,  2003 ). Th e investment agreement between the syndicate members may be 
important in specifying rights of access to information, board membership rights, etc., 
for non-lead syndicate members, but may be limited by the problems associated with 
the complexity of contracting. 
 It is in the interests of the lead venture capital fi rm not to mislead syndicate partners 
in sharing information because of the potentially damaging impact on reputation and 
lack of willingness to reciprocate future deals ( Wright and Lockett,  2003 ). Repeated 
interaction can lead to high levels of trust as syndicate members come to know how 
partners will behave ( Lockett and Wright,  1999 ). As venture capital industries are typi-
cally small close-knit communities, this scope for building trust and reputations is 
enhanced ( Black and Gilson,  1998 ). 
 Another possibility to reduce these “principal-principal” moral hazard problems is to 
use the IPO fi rm’s governance system as a mechanism for “arbitrage” between the poten-
tially diverse objectives of syndicate partners ( Filatotchev and Bishop,  2002 ;  Gompers, 
 1995 ). Where skilled lead venture capital fi rms are less reliant on other syndicate mem-
bers for specialist information ( Admati and Pfl eiderer,  1994 ) and are more likely than 
non-leads to exert hands-on infl uence over investees ( Wright and Lockett,  2003 ), the 
development of an independent board may be important in ensuring that the syndicate 
functions eff ectively. Non-lead syndicate members may seek the appointment of an 
independent non-executive chair to perform the functions of an “arbiter.” Non-executive 
board membership may be increased through the presence of non-lead syndicate mem-
bers to enhance transparency in decision-making and thus c-operation ( Wright and 
Lockett,  2003 ).  Filatotchev et al. ( 2006 ) provide evidence that IPOs backed by syndi-
cates of VCs are more likely to develop independent boards than are IPOs backed by 
single VCs. 
 In addition to the above arguments, a resource-based perspective suggests that syndi-
cation can bring specialized resources for the ex post management of investments. By 
syndicating deals, VC fi rms are able to increase the portfolio they can optimally manage 
through resource sharing ( Jääskeläinen et al.,  2006 ;  Kanniainen and Keuschnigg,  2003 ). 
VC fi rms can access more information by syndicating with other reputable VC fi rms. 
However, in specialist areas, VC fi rms may seek to syndicate with industrial partners. 
Th ese industrial partners may have more specialist knowledge than either the VC fi rm 
itself or other VCs. Th is knowledge can be important in evaluating the initial invest-
ment, in post-investment management, and in providing an eventual exit route. 
 As the investee develops, there may be a need to access further signifi cant funds. Th e 
initial VC backer may have the specialist market-based skills, but need to access further 
funds to diversify the risk associated with scaling up the operation. As VC funds are 
typically small ( Reid,  1998 ), they may seek to syndicate deals that are large relative to 
their fund size, which typically involve later-stage private equity funds ( Lockett and 
Wright,  2001 ). VC syndicates may therefore also syndicate with private equity fi rms that 
specialize in later-stage ventures. 
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 Again, these arguments emphasize the dual governance roles of private equity syndi-
cates in IPO fi rms. By syndicating IPO deals, private equity investors may diversify their 
assets and undertake a substantial resource commitment to a portfolio fi rm. Th is may 
enhance the IPO fi rm’s “value” and reduce agency costs associated with adverse selec-
tion problems, leading to a substantial improvement of performance. However, private 
equity syndicate may create their own set of agency problems associated with the the 
diverse interests of partners and partner opportunism. Th is would make post-issue 
monitoring less effi  cient and more problematic, leading to an increase in moral hazard 
agency costs. 
 Discussion and Future Research 
 Governance research is growing in importance and the governance role of boards, exec-
utive incentives, and ownership eff ects is a central feature of such research. Most studies 
on the eff ects of governance on performance have examined mature companies, and 
have used samples drawn from the common law environments of the US and, to a more 
limited degree, the UK. However, a growing appreciation is forming of the heterogene-
ity of governance mechanisms ( Aguilera and Jackson,  2003 ) and of how the appropriate 
governance mechanisms may diff er as the setting of the fi rm changes ( Filatotchev and 
Wright,  2005 ;  Lynall et al.,  2003 ). To date, empirical work has not fully explored these 
conceptual developments, especially in the context of IPO fi rms. 
 For entrepreneurial fi rms, the IPO is both the sign of a high degree of success to date and 
an indication that the fi rm will have greater resources to pursue its strategic goals in the 
future. For entrepreneurs, who are oft en referred to as “paper millionaires” until the IPO 
stock market fl otation, the IPO is the fi rst opportunity to actually obtain cash from their 
entrepreneurial venture. Th e IPO is thus a highly signifi cant event for the entrepreneurial 
fi rm, where “investors’ discount” can steal part of the benefi t that the entrepreneurial fi rm 
and the entrepreneur may seek from the IPO. Th is research extends our understanding of 
the role played by corporate governance in the IPO and informs future research on this 
important event in the life of an entrepreneurial fi rm. 
 However, whether governance mechanisms developed in mature companies are fully 
suitable for the “entrepreneurial nature” of the IPO process is still open to discussion 
among academics and practitioners. For example, the debate about just how the IPO 
company selects members of the board still remains open to interpretation. Should inde-
pendent directors be advisors to an entrepreneur, monitors working on behalf of inves-
tors, or both? Whilst some researchers emphasize the importance of the resource-based 
view of the board in an IPO fi rm, there is limited qualitative data that enables this partic-
ular aspect of the fi rm’s development to be investigated fully. Indicators point to selection 
being against both resources and peer-based knowledge of the executives rather than 
through nominations committees (as would be found in mature companies), and the 
covert world of executive search companies has certainly not been explored. 
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 As for compensation, there are two particular issues that interact with the IPO com-
pany. First, the levels of survival have a major impact on the vesting and gains that can be 
made from any long-term incentives that may be awarded at the point of the IPO. Th e 
undertone is that executives gain vast rewards in this way, yet many fi rms disappear as a 
result of acquisition and mergers following their off ering (and some even de-list). Some 
studies argue that failure rates within the fi rst three years of fl otation range from 6–42 
percent ( Bradley et al.,  2006 ;  Kooli and Meknassi,  2007 ;  Schultz,  1993 ). Th is is particu-
larly relevant as many option schemes follow a three-year vesting period, failure would 
mean that an option lapses, and any merger/acquisition would involve the restructuring 
of pay/incentives. Th us the incentive mantra of linking pay to equity to enhance IPO 
performance still has the potential for further investigation. 
 Th e research has strong implications for studies of the short-term IPO performance 
and venture capital, in line with  Busenitz et al.’s ( 2005 ) arguments that there is a need for 
more refi ned and specifi c examinations of signaling theory. Th e key to such future 
research is employing fi ner-grained methods which allow richer insights to be drawn. 
As discussed earlier in the chapter, the inconclusive results seen in much of the prior 
research on the performance of VC-backed IPOs is likely in part due to the coarse meth-
ods that have been used. Greater specifi cation of the sample and of the variables is 
required for the investigation of IPOs and signaling. Th e impacts of the variables are 
very distinct, and if these factors are blended in a coarse manner their organizational 
outcomes may be ambiguous. In addition, a growing body of research within corporate 
fi nance and organizational theory maintains that corporate governance factors should 
not be considered in isolation from each other, but instead they should be examined as 
“bundles” when determining their effi  ciency outcomes. For example,  Sanders and Boivie 
( 2004 ) argue that IPOs represent a number of interrelated governance signals which 
may complement or substitute for each other. Th erefore, further theoretical refi ning of 
signaling theory is in order. 
 Our survey of IPO literature suggests that institutional factors, such as the depth and 
breadth of the private equity industry and corporate governance-related regulatory ini-
tiatives, may aff ect the IPO investment process in terms of both the extent of IPO per-
formance and the role of diff erent types of fi nancier. Th ere is growing recognition that 
governance and the operation of VC fi rms may depend on the institutional environ-
ment ( Chahine et al.,  2012 ;  Black and Gilson,  1998 ;  Jeng and Wells,  2000 ). Further 
research might usefully extend analysis of the role of risk fi nanciers in other institutional 
contexts, such as countries associated with network-based corporate governance sys-
tems ( La Porta et al.,  1997 ). For example, it is clear that the extent of syndication is sig-
nifi cantly greater in the US venture capital industry compared with that in Europe 
( Wright and Lockett,  2003 ). Future analysis may also shed light on the main drivers of 
syndicated investments as well as their organizational outcomes. 
 More generally, an increasing number of studies suggest that agency problems may be 
diff erent in diff erent national settings and imply that researchers should integrate the 
agency framework with institutional analysis to generate robust predictions ( Chahine 
et al.,  2012 ). Future research should expand on this concept further and seek to more 
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explicitly examine the nature of agency confl icts and their implications in diff erent insti-
tutional settings ( Aguilera and Jackson,  2003 ). For example, in addition to French civil 
law contexts (e.g. Spain and Italy,  Hoskisson et al.,  2004 ), there are also German civil law 
and the distinctive Scandinavian legal environment ( Fiss and Zajac,  2004 ;  La Porta et al., 
 1998 ,  2000 ). Do these institutional environments have an impact similar to French civil 
law? Alternatively, investor protection in German civil law is less prevalent than in com-
mon law, but more so than in French civil law. Is the impact of German civil law some-
where between the other two legal environments? 
 It is important to look at specifi c corporate governance channels, such as board pres-
ence, contractual framework etc., which facilitate monitoring of IPO fi rms. Although a 
comprehensive analysis of this complex interplay of various governance factors goes 
beyond the scope of this chapter,  Bruton et al. ( 2009 ) suggest that institutional diff er-
ences signifi cantly aff ect the roles played by diff erent internal governance mechanisms. 
Researchers need to conduct a more fi ne-grained analysis to understand the aspects of 
the interplay of these variables on corporate governance. 
 Finally, an IPO is not the fi nal stage in the corporate governance life cycle. In a 
dynamic perspective, corporate governance factors may be aff ected by strategic choices 
and outcomes, and the choice of the various governance options could be associated 
with changes in organizational strategy and fi rm performance. For example, board 
diversity may be driven by the organization’s growing need to manage the important 
external elements of the environment that are related to changes in the organization’s 
size and diversity ( Provan,  1980 ). Th erefore, the post-IPO evolution of the fi rm’s govern-
ance system is a key research issue. 
 Notes 
 1. Researchers commonly focus on a one-day window (trading at the end of day one) when 
evaluating underpricing ( Loughran and Ritter,  2004 ). A few studies have examined trading 
at the end of one month. 
 2.  Megginson and Weiss ( 1991 ) compare VC-backed IPOs with non-VC-backed IPOs from 
1983 to 1987. Matched by industry and off ering size, they fi nd that the initial underpricing 
of VC-backed IPOs is signifi cantly lower than for non-VC-backed IPOs.  Barry et al. ( 1990 ) 
analyze the monitoring role of VCs in IPOs from 1978 to 1987. Th ey fi nd that the number of 
VCs invested in the issuing fi rm is negatively related to initial underpricing. 
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